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I. INTRODUCTION 
The boilerplate debate is but a chapter in the story of liberalism, and 
both must face the problem of freedom.  Given the individualistic nature 
of the Good, “[t]he problem in liberal society then becomes to insure that 
each individual will achieve the greatest amount of liberty, the freedom 
to pursue her own desires, and to establish an order that can restrain 
conflicts among individuals and that does not favor some at the expense 
of others.”1 
Alasdair MacIntyre has argued that the problem of freedom cannot 
be solved by liberal theory.  Liberal theory sets individual rights against 
social utility in an incoherent debate.  Because liberalism has no 
conception of human nature, there is no rational way to choose between 
rights and utility.  Thus, liberalism becomes a disguise for imposing 
people’s arbitrary preferences by force. 
And yet the boilerplate debate resists MacIntyre’s critique.  In the 
boilerplate debate, rights and utility are not set against each other.  
 
*  Assistant Professor, Regent University School of Law.  B.A., University of Nevada-
Reno; J.D., Duke University School of Law.  The author thanks Charles Fried, H. Jefferson 
Powell, C. Scott Pryor, Andrew Verstein, and Jack S. Wroldsen for their comments on drafts 
of this Article. 
1.  Drucilla Cornell, Toward a Modern/Postmodern Reconstruction of Ethics, 133 U. PA. 
L. REV. 291, 329 (1985) (footnote omitted). 
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Although there is profound disagreement between libertarians and 
progressives over boilerplate, they agree about the terms of the debate: 
the enforcement of boilerplate must vindicate both individual rights and 
social utility. 
This overarching agreement implies that—contrary to the tenets of 
liberalism—the boilerplate debate is regulated by some concept of human 
nature.  Therefore, boilerplate theorists must direct their attention to 
human nature if they are to resolve the problem of freedom in boilerplate 
contracts. 
This Article does not attempt to resolve the boilerplate debate, 
although elsewhere I have tried to do so.2  This Article has different 
purposes.  First, this Article demonstrates that the boilerplate debate is 
part of a much broader debate in liberalism.  Second, this Article argues 
that the boilerplate debate resists Alasdair MacIntyre’s critique of 
liberalism.  Third, and most importantly, this Article seeks to reorient the 
boilerplate debate toward a discussion of human nature. 
Part I of this Article describes liberal political theory as a dialectic 
narrative between libertarianism and progressivism, as well as Alasdair 
MacIntyre’s profound critique of liberalism.  Part II of this Article 
describes the boilerplate debate as it has taken place over the last 
hundred years.  Part III of this Article situates the boilerplate debate 
within liberalism.  Part IV of this Article argues that the boilerplate 
debate resists MacIntyre’s critique of liberalism, indicating that the 
boilerplate debate is regulated by concepts of human nature and purpose. 
II. THE LIBERALISM STORY 
A. Tale of Two Liberties 
Once upon a time, there was Authority, and people were ruled from 
on high.3  They were ruled politically, spiritually, and intellectually.4  They 
were ruled by kings, priests, and Aristotle.5  They had few rights, whether 
 
2.  See generally Kenneth K. Ching, What We Consent to When We Consent to Form 
Contracts: Market Price, 84 UMKC L. REV. 1 (2015). 
3.  L.T. HOBHOUSE, LIBERALISM 10 (1964); J.M. ROBERTS, THE NEW HISTORY OF THE 
WORLD 572 (2003) (“Everywhere . . . the relative strength of rulers vis-à-vis their rivals 
increased greatly from the sixteenth century onwards.”). 
4.  See J.M. KELLY, A SHORT HISTORY OF WESTERN LEGAL THEORY 160, 164, 207 
(1992). 
5.  See id.; ROBERTS, supra note 3, at 570. 
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to property or contract, life or liberty.6  They were not the masters of their 
fates or captains of their souls.7  They were not autonomous: they 
obeyed.8  They obeyed the rules of their stations, to which they were 
assigned at birth, and they obeyed the commands of their superiors.9 
And the people suffered when authority was abused.  Kings ruled 
their subjects arbitrarily, and their subjects’ lives and property were 
insecure.10  Peasants were compelled to provide labor for their lords, and 
they had no right to move or seek new employment.11  People were taxed 
heavily to finance standing armies and vain wars.12  Yet the nobles were 
not taxed.13  They were given special privileges over the poor.14  The 
church was not taxed.15  In fact, the church added to people’s burdens 
through its collection of tithes.16  So for some, there were great privileges, 
 
6.  See HENRY SUMNER MAINE, ANCIENT LAW 183–84 (1861); KEVIN M. TEEVEN, A 
HISTORY OF THE ANGLO-AMERICAN COMMON LAW OF CONTRACT 1 (1990) (“During the 
Middle Ages, property was not ‘owned’ in the modern sense and so could not be freely 
contracted for.  The economy of that time was not influenced to any significant degree by 
market forces . . . .  In circumstances where an economy is not directed by market forces and 
where a society delineates a person’s rights based on the status one was born into, there is little 
need of, nor opportunity for, either freedom of contract or a flexible contractual device for 
planning.”). 
7.  ROBERTS, supra note 3, at 562 (“Three hundred years ago, many men and women 
believed [social forms and institutions] to be virtually God-given . . . .”). 
8.  Cf. KELLY, supra note 4, at 209 (“[Social-contract theory] was quite at odds with a 
theocratic view of government, one which saw kings as divinely appointed, and their subjects 
as divinely commanded to obey them . . . .”). 
9.  See MAINE, supra note 6, at 183. 
10.  Cf. HOBHOUSE, supra note 3, at 16 (“Both logically and historically the first point of 
attack is arbitrary government, and the first liberty to be secured is the right to be dealt with in 
accordance with law.  A man who has no legal rights against another, but stands entirely at his 
disposal, to be treated according to his caprice, is a slave to that other.  He is ‘rightless,’ devoid 
of rights.”). 
11.  JOHN DEWEY, LIBERALISM AND SOCIAL ACTION 18 (Prometheus Books 2000) 
(1991); KELLY, supra note 4, at 162; ROBERTS, supra note 3, at 563, 567. 
12.  KELLY, supra note 4, at 246–47.  French aristocrats  
enjoyed and jealously preserved the most odious and abusive privileges, notably 
freedom from taxation; this, together with the Church’s similar freedom in respect of 
its own vast wealth, meant . . . an impossibly narrow tax base from which the royal 
government was left to squeeze the revenue to support world-wide wars. 
Id.; see also ROBERTS, supra note 3, at 573 (“[F]or three centuries great fertility of imagination 
was to be shown in inventing new taxes . . . .  Usually, this bore disproportionately on the 
poorest . . . .”). 
13.  KELLY, supra note 4, at 246–47.  
14.  ROBERTS, supra note 3, at 567. 
15.  KELLY, supra note 4, at 246–47; ROBERTS, supra note 3, at 574. 
16.  Anti-clericalism grew based on the “opposition to tithes and to low standards among 
 634 MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW [99:631 
but not for common people.17  For commoners, there was no hope of 
improving their condition.18  They could not own property.19  They had 
little ability to arrange their private affairs through contracts.20  There was 
no market, and so no opportunity to sell their goods and services to the 
highest bidder.21 
And who were they to complain?  The king was appointed by God, 
and the church said people had no right to resist their rulers.22  Aristotle 
explained that it was good for them to be ruled by their betters because 
they were by nature slaves.23  “[F]or most of human history most people’s 
lives have been deeply and cruelly shaped by the fact that they have had 
little or no choice about the way in which they could provide themselves 
and their families with shelter and enough to eat.”24 
But things changed.25  Galileo debunked Aristotle.26  The 
Reformation shattered the rule and unity of the Church.27  People 
 
the clergy . . . .”  Cf. KELLY, supra note 4, at 162. 
17.  Id. at 246–47, 270; ROBERTS, supra note 3, at 563, 574. 
18.  ROBERTS, supra note 3, at 549. 
19.  TEEVEN, supra note 6, at 1. 
20.  Id. 
21.  Id. 
22.  KELLY, supra note 4, at 174; see also ROBERTS, supra note 3, at 564–65. 
23.  Cf. KELLY, supra note 4, at 195 (quoting Fernando Vazquez: “Who could endure the 
impudence—not to say the unforgivable offensiveness—of Aristotle, when he says in the first 
book of his Politics that men of slow intellect should be considered to have been born slaves by 
nature, or for the service of people of greater wisdom? . . . And surely a much truer and more 
worthy view is that of those upright and weighty jurists, who have written that slaves have been 
made so only by the legal systems of men . . . while by the law of nature they have continued to 
be free.”). 
24.  ROBERTS, supra note 3, at 549. 
25.  Id. at 564–65 (“[A] broad tendency towards social change which strained old forms is 
observable in many countries by 1700.”).  These changes included literacy, social awareness, 
the rise of a market economy, increased mobility, and increased populations in towns.  See 
KELLY, supra note 4, at 163 (movable type was invented, allowing lay persons to own Bibles); 
HOBHOUSE, supra note 3, at 14 (“The modern State . . . starts from the basis of an authoritarian 
order, and the protest against that order, a protest religious, political, economic, social, and 
ethical, is the historic beginning of Liberalism.”). 
26.  ARTHUR HERMAN, THE CAVE AND THE LIGHT: PLATO VERSUS ARISTOTLE, AND 
THE STRUGGLE FOR THE SOUL OF WESTERN CIVILIZATION 330–31 (2013); Granger Meador, 
Unit 3: Falling Bodies, Reading: Galileo Drops Aristotle, INQUIRY PHYSICS (2008), 
http://www.bps-ok.org/physics/inquiryfiles/03reading.pdf [https://perma.cc/XCN5-C7CN]. 
27.  BRUCE L. SHELLEY, CHURCH HISTORY IN PLAIN ENGLISH 237 (3d ed. 2008); cf. 
KELLY, supra note 4, at 159 (“[T]he revival of the Graeco-Roman tradition in art and literature, 
and . . . the Protestant Reformation . . . brought into life the factors from which, in turn, the 
modern world was born: the secularization of public life and the emancipation of the lay 
individual from spiritual authority.”). 
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revolted against their kings.28  Authority began giving way to autonomy.29  
Traditional social hierarchies defined people less,30 and people thought 
for themselves more.31  They believed they had the capacity and the right 
to make judgments about all things, free from the authority of tradition.32  
People did not need to conform to a pre-assigned human nature; they 
could choose for themselves what they wanted be.33 
Individuals were by nature free and equal.34  They were born with 
rights such as life, liberty, and property.35  People only gave up these 
“natural” rights to governments so that those rights could be protected 
and made effective.36  Governments did not naturally have authority; 
authority was delegated to government by the consent of the people.37  
 
28.  See HERMAN, supra note 26, at 401–04; ROBERTS, supra note 3, at 574; cf. KELLY, 
supra note 4, at 162 (“[A] series of largely peasant revolts . . . .  These were provoked by 
taxation and noble oppression, and . . . the system . . . whereby the peasant was compelled to 
perform labour services for his lord . . . .”); id. at 244 (“[A]ncient European structures of 
authority and legitimacy were irreparably fractured by the French and American 
Revolutions.”). 
29.  See KELLY, supra note 4, at 207 (“But free enquiry implied the repudiation not just 
of ecclesiastical but of all authority, even that of Aristotle, the most venerable of the ancient 
pagan philosophers.”). 
30.  ROBERTS, supra note 3, at 563–65. 
31.  There was a spirit of “independent judgment, of intellectual freedom and self-
reliance, which was the very opposite of the old medieval mentality, accustomed to accept the 
Church’s authority on everything.”  Cf. KELLY, supra note 4, at 166.  Erasmus looked to 
Europe’s emancipation from “spiritual and ultimately from all intellectual authority.”  Id. 
32.  See CHARLES FRIED, MODERN LIBERTY AND THE LIMITS OF GOVERNMENT 97 
(2007); cf. KELLY, supra note 4, at 244 (“The [eighteenth] century also contained the high point 
of the intellectual epoch which prepared the ground for revolution, the so-called 
‘Enlightenment’, whose central feature was a rejection of all spiritual and intellectual 
authority . . . .”). 
33.  Cf. JAMES GORDLEY, THE PHILOSOPHICAL ORIGINS OF MODERN CONTRACT 
DOCTRINE 119 (1991) (explaining that John Locke held that there was no ultimate end that 
defined human beings). 
34.  The French Constitution of 3 September 1791 asserted that “men are born and remain 
free and equal in rights . . . .”  See KELLY, supra note 4, at 169, 291. 
35.  See id. at 216. 
36.  DEWEY, supra note 11, at 15–16. 
37.  Richard Hooker said: 
Without which consent there were no reason that one man should take upon him to 
be lord or judge over another; because, although there be, according to the opinion 
of some very great and judicious men, a kind of natural right in the noble, wise, and 
virtuous, to govern those which are of servile disposition; nevertheless, for 
manifestation of this, their right, and men’s more peaceable contentment on both 
sides, the assent of those who are governed seemeth necessary. 
KELLY, supra note 4, at 171, 218. 
 636 MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW [99:631 
Therefore, political authority was essentially democratic.38  And people 
wanted rule of law, not arbitrary government.39  Even kings should be 
subject to the law.40  So the old regimes of privilege, injustice, intolerance, 
and arbitrary government were put down, and the individual was lifted 
up.41 
The individual became primary, the lens through which government 
was viewed.  “Individuals come first. . . . [S]ocieties, nations, families, 
team, traditions, religions, languages, and cultures—are the products of 
individual persons.”42  The individual came before the government both 
chronologically and morally.43  Given that individuals were the basic 
social and moral unit, coercion of the individual against his will was a 
great offence.44  An individual was not to be used as a means to someone 
else’s ends.45 
Thus, the individual and the rights he had delegated both defined and 
limited the government.46  The government’s only purpose was to secure 
the individual’s natural rights and then do no more.47  Any overstepping 
 
38.  Id. at 207. 
39.  HOBHOUSE, supra note 3, at 17. 
40.  Cf. Kelly, supra note 4, at 234.  King James was suspending the law, “levying money 
and keeping a standing army in peacetime” without the consent of Parliament.  Id.  He was 
imposing excessive bail and fines, all contrary to the law.  Id.  Equality meant that before the 
law “every person may be bound alike, and that no tenure, estate, charter, degree, birth or 
place do confer any exemption from the ordinary course of legal proceedings whereunto others 
are subjected.”  Id. at 236. 
41.  Id. at 270. 
42.  FRIED, supra note 32, at 19 (footnote omitted). 
43.  See DEWEY, supra note 11, at 16. 
44.  FRIED, supra note 32, at 22 (“When others try to force me to do what I judge I do not 
want to do, or try to trick me into believing what I would not otherwise believe, they attack my 
person at its deepest level.”). 
45.  ISAIAH BERLIN, FOUR ESSAYS ON LIBERTY 131 (reprt. 1971) (1969) (“I wish my life 
and decisions to depend on myself, not on external forces of whatever kind.  I wish to be the 
instrument of my own, not of other men’s, acts of will.”); FRIED, supra note 32, at 22. 
46.  According to John Locke, government cannot be  
absolutely arbitrary over the lives and fortunes of the people. For it being but the joint 
power of every member of the society given up to that person or assembly which is 
legislator, it can be no more than those persons had in a state of Nature before they 
entered into society . . . .  For nobody can transfer to another more power than he has 
in himself . . . . 
KELLY, supra note 4, at 217; see also HOBHOUSE, supra note 3, at 33. 
47.  DEWEY, supra note 11, at 16–17 (“It defined the individual in terms of liberties of 
thought and action already possessed by him . . . and which it was the sole business of the state 
to safeguard . . . .  It followed that the great enemy of individual liberty was thought to be 
government because of its tendency to encroach upon the innate liberties of individuals.”); 
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of this bound was ultra vires, and an individual’s civil rights were to mirror 
his natural rights as closely as possible.48  This meant that government 
owed the individual a negative liberty: an individual should not be 
prevented from attaining his goals, but no one, including the government, 
owed him the positive duty of helping him attain his goals.49 
These individualistic doctrines were not only moral; they were 
practical.50  Progress and civilization were to spring from “the action of 
individuals.”51  Individuals, not governments, knew what was best for 
themselves.52  Adam Smith taught that the unfettered activity of 
individuals was the “wellspring of social progress.”53  Each person would 
work to improve his own condition, his own self-interest.54  And an 
unregulated market would make men’s self-interest productive, not just 
for themselves, but for society: “Allowing free trades on open 
markets . . . increases efficiency and maximizes individual welfare by 
channeling resources to their highest and best use.”55  Out of self-interest, 
men would use their capacities to create the goods and services they could 
sell at the highest price, and these products would be those things for 
which society had the greatest need.56  This convergence of unplanned 
individual efforts and desires would generate unprecedented material 
abundance and benefit society as a whole.57  Government interference 
 
HOBHOUSE, supra note 3, at 33. 
48.  See HOBHOUSE, supra note 3, at 33 (“Civil rights should agree as nearly as possible 
with natural rights . . . .”). 
49.  BERLIN, supra note 45, at 122 (“You lack political liberty or freedom only if you are 
prevented from attaining a goal by human beings.”); FRIED, supra note 32, at 51 (“[Liberty] is 
a relation among people.  It is a relation in which each person refrains from interfering with the 
self-determination of others.  It is a relation in which people respect each other—in a limited 
way, to be sure: they do not necessarily help each other get what they want or need . . . .”). 
50.  Cf. KELLY, supra note 4, at 305–06 (“[Economic regulation was] resisted not just by 
inhumanity and greed, but from the conviction that the state had no business to interfere in the 
relationships of master and workman or landlord and tenant, any more than in any other form 
of private contract.  This position was reinforced by the economic theory of the time . . . which 
saw the unimpeded operation of free market forces . . . as likely in the long run to best promote 
economic growth and thus the happiest overall result, whatever the temporary hardship to this 
or that individual or group . . . .”). 
51.  HOBHOUSE, supra note 3, at 34. 
52.  Cf. KELLY, supra note 4, at 317 (“[A] core belief of Benthamites was the sacredness 
of individual freedom, including freedom to contract, on the grounds that the individual must 
know best for himself what was most conducive to his own welfare . . . .”). 
53.  DEWEY, supra note 11, at 18; HOBHOUSE, supra note 3, at 44. 
54.  See DEWEY, supra note 11, at 19. 
55.  FRIED, supra note 32, at 72–73; see also HOBHOUSE, supra note 3, at 44–45. 
56.  DEWEY, supra note 11, at 19; HOBHOUSE, supra note 3, at 34. 
57.  DEWEY, supra note 11, at 19. 
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with such economic liberty would not only trample on people’s rights but 
hinder society’s progress.58  The best government could do was laissez-
faire.59 
But under laissez-faire, it became clear that people could not have 
freedom if they did not also have equality.60  Using their economic 
freedom, business interests concentrated their power until they occupied 
greatly superior bargaining power over those with whom they 
contracted.61  Individuals had little choice but to consent to whatever 
corporations offered them in the “free market,” as there was no one else 
to contract with.62  Such agreements were not based on true consent but 
on implicit coercion.63  When legislatures tried to come to the aid of 
workers, courts used “freedom of contract” as a tool to enforce the 
unequal positions of the parties.64  Private control now operated as 
oppressively as had public control.65  Corporations were like legislatures 
now, and they could dictate harsh terms to their inferiors.  It was like a 
return to feudalism or arbitrary government.66  What good was freedom 
 
58.  Id. at 20. 
59.  Id. at 22. 
60.  Cf. DEWEY, supra note 11, at 35 (“Thus from various sources and under various 
influences there developed an inner split in liberalism.”); KELLY, supra note 4, at 306 (“Critics 
of the ‘freedom of contract’ religion arose, who pointed out that there was no real freedom in 
a relationship where the starting positions of the two sides were grossly unequal.”). 
61.  Cf. TEEVEN, supra note 6, at 291 (“[In the nineteenth century], [t]he consolidation of 
business power in a few hands was the most important factor in the destruction of both market 
balance and equal economic opportunity.  The imbalance in distribution of wealth was 
aggravated by instrumental governmental policies protecting the strong through governmental 
franchises, public utilities and trusts. . . . The concentration of power in a few brought on a drift 
toward monopoly and a diminution of individual freedom to contract.  Liberalism’s former 
presumption that most contractors negotiated on an equal bargaining level was no longer 
applicable.” (footnote omitted)). 
62.  Id. (“Consent was gone when a person’s whole livelihood was in the market but he 
had no choice about the terms and often didn’t even have the right to contract with a person 
with an individual identity.”). 
63.  HOBHOUSE, supra note 3, at 50. 
64.  TEEVEN, supra note 6, at 299. 
65.  Private control of the “forces of production . . . operate in the same way as private 
unchecked control of political power.”  DEWEY, supra note 11, at 44. 
66.  TEEVEN, supra note 6, at 291 (“A former system of market exchanges based on 
freedom of equal contracting parties was replaced by a neo-feudal corporate system of relations 
based on superiors and inferiors.  Courts of the last quarter of the nineteenth 
century . . . refused to interfere with one-sided exercise of power since all contracts made in 
proper form were seen as enforceable. . . . Freedom of contract protected the unequal 
distribution of property but didn’t protect weaker parties from coercion by these owners of the 
means of production.” (footnote omitted)); cf. id. at 295 (“Some saw the weapon of ‘freedom 
of contract’ facilitating the imposition of a new feudal order by industrial and commercial 
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when there were no real choices?67  Freedom of contract had become a 
means for undermining freedom.  Laissez-faire had become the Ancien 
Régime.68 
Thus if individuals were to develop their capacities, government 
needed to exert more control over individuals.69  The state could not 
simply let freedom and nature take their “natural” course: many people 
were unable to benefit from such unregulated freedom.70  Under laissez- 
faire, lack of government control had increased coercion of the weak by 
the strong.71  People needed actual, not merely legal, liberty.72  Thus, the 
state needed to adopt its own agenda to further human progress.73  This 
progressivism was not intended to repudiate liberty, but to effectuate it.74  
It was understood that liberty was relative to particular social 
conditions.75  Medieval conditions may have required individualism, but 
 
overlords through the private legislation of standardized contracts . . . .” (footnote omitted)). 
67.  See id. (“It became an illusion that the law protected the public interest against the 
abuses of freedom of contract when freedom depended on one’s position on the economic 
ladder.”). 
68.  Cf. DEWEY, supra note 11, at 41 (“The economic and political changes for which they 
strove were so largely accomplished that they had become in turn the vested interest . . . .”); 
HOBHOUSE, supra note 3, at 47. 
69.  DEWEY, supra note 11, at 44 (“[S]ocial control of economic forces is equally necessary 
if anything approaching economic equality and liberty is to be realized.”); HOBHOUSE, supra 
note 3, at 54; KELLY, supra note 4, at 306 (“T.H. Green . . . restated the liberal faith in a form 
which made it include respect for the dignity of the individual, recognition that he should have 
the chance of fully unfolding his capacities, and an acknowledgment that the state had a role, 
which might take the form of legislative interference and regulation, in affording him the basic 
conditions in which this ideal might be achieved.  The force of this reconstructed liberalism was 
joined, in the 1880s, by beginnings of organized socialism . . . .”). 
70.  HOBHOUSE, supra note 3, at 80 (“We all admit a collective responsibility for children.  
Are there not grown-up people who stand just as much in need of care?  What of the idiot, the 
imbecile, the feeble-minded or the drunkard?  What does rational self-determination mean for 
these classes.”). 
71.  See TEEVEN, supra note 6, at 295. 
72.  DEWEY, supra note 11, at 37–40. 
73.  Id. at 34 (“[I]t is the business of the state to protect all forms and to promote all modes 
of human association in which the moral claims of the members of society are embodied and 
which serve as the means of voluntary self-realization.  Its business is negatively to remove the 
obstacles that stand in the way of individuals coming to consciousness of themselves for what 
they are, and positively to promote the cause of public education.”). 
74.  HOBHOUSE, supra note 3, at 47. 
75.  Cf. DEWEY, supra note 11, at 54 (“[T]he conception of liberty is always relative to 
forces that at a given time and place are increasingly felt to be oppressive.  Liberty in the 
concrete signifies release from the impact of particular oppressive forces . . . .”); TEEVEN, supra 
note 6, at 296 (“Thus Adam Smith could be seen as correct in protesting against eighteenth 
century paternalistic mercantile restrictions, but it was now argued that state intervention was 
necessary to provide positive assistance for the furtherance of human progress.”). 
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laissez-faire now required government intervention.76  By the nineteenth 
and twentieth centuries, government control over individual freedom had 
spread to many areas of public life.77 
We now turn from the narrative of liberalism to an analysis of that 
narrative.  Because of the tension between individual rights and social 
welfare, liberalism presents us with “the problem of freedom.”78  Given 
the individualistic nature of the Good, “[t]he problem in liberal society 
then becomes to insure that each individual will achieve the greatest 
amount of liberty, the freedom to pursue her own desires, and to establish 
an order that can restrain conflicts among individuals and that does not 
favor some at the expense of others.”79 
We have seen that there are two streams of liberalism, one libertarian 
and one progressive.  Libertarians believe people have natural rights such 
as life, liberty, property, and freedom of thought and contract.80  These 
rights are not conferred by the state; people possessed them before there 
were states.81  They are “prepolitical.”82  Such natural rights must be 
secure against government interference.83  
But progressives believe that rights are created and defined by 
society; rights are to be limited or extended based on the benefit provided 
to society as a whole.84  “[The community] may do with the individual 
what it pleases provided that it has the good of the whole in view.”85  Even 
the innermost aspects of a person, his thoughts, are considered “social.”86  
Though progressives are solicitous of individual rights (they believe the 
interest of individuals and their society ultimately coincide),87 they admit 
 
76.  See TEEVEN, supra note 6, at 296–97 (“The Progressives’ positive program was not 
meant to overthrow private enterprise but instead was a middle ground between socialism and 
individualism.”). 
77.  Id. at 296, 301; see also KELLY, supra note 4, at 352–53. 
78.  Cornell, supra note 1, at 328–29. 
79.  Id. at 329. 
80.  FRIED, supra note 32, at 80; HOBHOUSE, supra note 3, at 32. 
81.  DEWEY, supra note 11, at 15 (“The outstanding points of Locke’s version of liberalism 
are that governments are instituted to protect the rights that belong to individuals prior to 
political organization of social relations.”). 
82.  FRIED, supra note 32, at 80; HOBHOUSE, supra note 3, at 32. 
83.  FRIED, supra note 32, at 94; HOBHOUSE, supra note 3, at 52. 
84.  HOBHOUSE, supra note 3, at 36–38, 68. 
85.  Id. at 38. 
86.  Id. at 19. 
87.  See id. at 42. 
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that in the final analysis there is no aspect of an individual’s life that is not 
a social issue.88 
This difference over the nature of rights leads to a difference over the 
role of government.  Libertarians believe in limited government.89  The 
government’s role is to secure people’s natural rights, and to do more is 
to transgress its limits.90  Because man’s essence is his autonomy, 
“[p]aternalism is the greatest despotism imaginable.”91  Coercing men in 
the name of some social goal is a road to hell paved with good intentions.92  
But progressives believe government is not so limited and that it should 
be used as an instrument of good to advance people’s welfare, especially 
the economically disadvantaged.93 
Libertarians believe that individuals are entitled to plan their lives 
according to their own judgment, to choose their own vision of the 
Good.94  “It is the capacity to choose and judge for ourselves that is the 
essence of our individuality and so of our liberty.”95  Progressives deny, if 
only implicitly, that individuals may choose their own Good, at least in an 
 
88.  Id. at 65 (“We should frankly recognize that there is no side of a man’s life which is 
unimportant to society, for whatever he is, does, or thinks may affect his own well-being, which 
is and ought to be matter of common concern, and may also directly or indirectly affect the 
thought, action, and character of those with whom he comes in contact.”). 
89.  See LIBERTARIAN PARTY, LIBERTARIAN PARTY PLATFORM (2014), 
https://www.lp.org/files/2014_LP_Platform.pdf [https://perma.cc/5UAX-49QW]. 
90.  See DEWEY, supra note 11, at 15–16. 
91.  BERLIN, supra note 45, at 137. 
92.  Id. at 132–33 (“[W]e recognize that it is possible, and at times justifiable, to coerce 
men in the name of some goal (let us say, justice or public health) which they would, if they 
were more enlightened, themselves pursue . . . .  I am then claiming that I know what they truly 
need better than they know it themselves . . . .  Once I take this view, I am in a position to ignore 
the actual wishes of men or societies, to bully, oppress, torture them in the name, and on behalf, 
of their ‘real’ selves . . . .”); cf. HOBHOUSE, supra note 3, at 26–28.  Hobhouse, an early leader 
of progressivism, opines that it is “doubtful” that the American “Negro . . . [is] mentally and 
morally capable of self-government . . . .”  HOBHOUSE, supra note 3, at 26–27.  He also argues 
against universal suffrage on the grounds that “people as a whole might be careless of their 
rights and incapable of managing them. . . . It is perfectly possible that from the point of view 
of general liberty and social progress a limited franchise might give better results than one that 
is more extended.”  Id. at 28. 
93.  DEWEY, supra note 11, at 30 (“Gradually a change came over the spirit and meaning 
of liberalism.  It came surely, if gradually, to be disassociated from the laissez faire creed and 
to be associated with the use of governmental action for aid to those at economic disadvantage 
and for alleviation of their conditions.”). 
94.  FRIED, supra note 32, at 94. 
95.  Id.  
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absolute sense.96  Progressives believe that at times certain social goods 
must trump the freedom of an individual.97 
Despite these profound differences, there is a family resemblance 
between libertarianism and progressivism.  Both emphasize the right of 
individuals to develop their own capacities.98  Both claim to promote the 
welfare of both individuals and society.99  Both believe that people’s 
freedom must be limited to some extent if their freedom is to be effective, 
and yet both believe there are limits to those limits: there must be some 
degree of individual freedom that government does not invade.100  Both 
are protests against abuse of power.101 
B. MacIntyre’s Critique of Liberalism 
Alasdair MacIntyre has argued that the liberal dialectic between 
libertarianism and progressivism is incoherent and can never be rationally 
resolved.102  One side of the debate argues in terms of rights and limited 
government.103  The other side argues in terms of utility, emphasizing that 
individual rights are subordinate to social welfare.104  But this debate 
suffers from “conceptual incommensurability.”105  There is no rational 
way to decide which should have priority between rights and utility.106  
Many efforts have been made to demonstrate a rational, secular basis for 
 
96.  Id. at 89; HOBHOUSE, supra note 3, at 68. 
97.  HOBHOUSE, supra note 3, at 38, 68. 
98.  Cf. DEWEY, supra note 11, at 33 (Progressives “remained faithful . . . to the ideals of 
liberalism; the conceptions of a common good as the measure of political organization and 
policy, of liberty as the most precious trait and very seal of individuality, of the claim of every 
individual to the full development of his capacities.”); FRIED, supra note 32, at 94 (“[O]nly in 
a regime of secure entitlements can there be liberty.  Only in such a regime are individuals able 
to plan and develop their lives according to their plans, secure against the imposition of 
others.”); HOBHOUSE, supra note 3, at 60. 
99.  FRIED, supra note 32, at 72–74; HOBHOUSE, supra note 3, at 60. 
100.  BERLIN, supra note 45, at 124 (“[T]he area of men’s free action must be limited by 
law. . . . [But] there ought to exist a certain minimum area of personal freedom which must on 
no account be violated; for if it is overstepped, the individual will find himself in an area too 
narrow for even that minimum development of his natural faculties which alone makes it 
possible to pursue, and even to conceive, the various ends which men hold good or right or 
sacred. It follows that a frontier must be drawn between the area of private life and that of 
public authority.”); FRIED, supra note 32, at 89–90; HOBHOUSE, supra note 3, at 17. 
101.  HOBHOUSE, supra note 3, at 75; KELLY, supra note 4, at 270–71. 
102.  See ALASDAIR MACINTYRE, AFTER VIRTUE 6–8 (2d ed. 1984). 
103.  See generally id. 
104.  Id. 
105.  Id. at 8. 
106.  Id. 
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one framework or the other, but MacIntyre argues that all such efforts 
have failed.107  It is in reference to these issues of “conceptual 
incommensurability” and irrationality that I will later show that the 
boilerplate debate resists MacIntyre’s critique. 
However, according to MacIntyre, given liberalism’s failure to give 
rational grounds for its moral judgments, such judgments must be 
expressions “of attitude or feeling” and “neither true nor false.”108  So all 
that can be done is to presuppose the priority of one or the other; there is 
no rational justification for any claims that an objective moral standard 
exists.109  Given that there is no rational basis for choosing between rights 
and utility as a basis for morality and ethics, such a decision can only be 
made by an act of will.110  This means that the choice between moral 
frameworks is arbitrary.111  Because morality is arbitrary, Nietzsche held 
to a principled irrationalism for “if there is nothing to morality but 
expression of will, my morality can only be what my will creates.”112  
Ultimately, we can only try to force our wills upon each other.113 
According to MacIntyre, we have arrived at this philosophy of 
“Emotivism” by way of our escape from the authoritarianism of the 
middle ages as “the individual” was freed from “constraining hierarchies” 
and the “superstitions of teleology,” including the notion that human 
beings have a human nature.114  So although the individual gained 
“sovereignty in its own realm” by casting off Medievalism in favor of 
Modernism, it left behind “its traditional boundaries provided by a social 
identity and a view of human life as ordered to a given end.”115  Ethics 
requires an account of human nature and human purpose.116  For 
example, Aristotle said human beings were rational animals made for the 
purpose of eudemonia, or happiness.117  But modern thought rejected 
“any teleological view of human nature, any view of man as having an 
essence which defines his true end.”118  
 
107.  Id. at 54–61. 
108.  Id. at 12. 
109.  Id. at 19. 
110.  Id. at 20–21. 
111.  See id. at 8. 
112.  Id. at 26, 113–14. 
113.  Id. at 26. 
114.  Id. at 14, 34. 
115.  Id. at 34. 
116.  Id. at 52. 
117.  Id. at 148. 
118.  Id. at 54. 
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What is left after telos is rejected as an incoherent moral scheme in 
which human nature is conceived of as needing moral education and 
“moral injunctions” (i.e., promises should be kept) but without any 
agreed upon purpose for why.119  In such a situation, any appeal to moral 
rules must “appear as a mere instrument of individual desire and will.”120  
Modern philosophy tries to substitute utility for teleology and underwrite 
“rights” with reason.121  But utility proves an unworkable criteria for 
ethics,122 and a secular account of human rights has failed.123  Utility and 
rights are marshalled to make arguments seem objective, but in fact, they 
are only vehicles for modern individuals’ will to power.124 
II. THE BOILERPLATE DEBATE 
For nearly one hundred years, one venue for the liberalism dialectic 
has been the boilerplate debate.  By “boilerplate,” this Article refers to 
contracts of adhesion in which there is a significant disparity in bargaining 
power between the parties, the offeror offers terms on a “take it or leave 
it” basis, and the contract is formed after little or no negotiation.  We will 
see that the boilerplate debate parallels the liberalism dialectic, and then 
we will consider what liberalism tells us about boilerplate and what 
boilerplate tells us about liberalism. 
In the late nineteenth century, the mass production and distribution 
of goods and services led business firms to use form contracts to 
standardize their relationships with their customers.125  Form contracts 
decrease a firm’s transaction costs and increase its efficiency.126  The use 
of form contracts eliminated the costly process of bargaining with 
 
119.  Id. at 55, 65. 
120.  Id. at 62. 
121.  Id. at 62–64. 
122.  When it is recommended that  
we should guide our own choice by the prospects of our own future pleasure or 
happiness, the appropriate retort is to enquire: ‘But which pleasure, which happiness 
ought to guide me?’ . . .  [A]ppeal to the criteria of pleasure will not tell me whether 
to drink or swim and appeal to those of happiness cannot decide for me between the 
life of a monk and that of a soldier. 
Id. at 63–64. 
123.  Id. at 69; see also Nicholas Wolterstorff, Can Human Rights Survive Secularization?, 
54 VILL. L. REV. 411 (2009). 
124.  MACINTYRE, supra note 102, at 71. 
125.  TEEVEN, supra note 6, at 294. 
126.  Todd D. Rakoff, Contracts of Adhesion: An Essay in Reconstruction, 96 HARV. L. 
REV. 1173, 1221–22 (1983). 
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individuals, replacing labor intensive and potentially idiosyncratic 
negotiations with efficient take-it-or-leave-it forms, all while preserving 
and enhancing a firm’s ability to negotiate later in the event of a 
dispute.127  Forms also gave firms control over their agents by limiting 
negotiation to a small number of terms and preventing the agent from 
departing from the “script,” thus facilitating the management of the 
firm.128  Forms facilitated the firm’s planning and security by making the 
terms of a contract more certain, both because they were specified in 
great detail and because they were drafted by the firm, and thereby firms 
gained some control over potential disputes, made risks easier to predict, 
and made business more efficient.129 
It has been estimated that 99% of contracts are form contracts, and 
form contracts are acknowledged as a modern necessity.130  However, for 
at least one hundred years, commentators have expressed concerns over 
adhesion contracts.131  The absence of consumer consent to adhesion 
contracts is one primary problem as the consumer does not read or 
understand boilerplate before signing it, and even if he did, he would have 
minimal alternatives unless he were willing to forgo most goods and 
services.132  “[T]his fact tends to suggest two polar positions: all terms are 
valid, because signing is binding, or all form terms are potentially invalid, 
because they are neither bargained for nor agreed upon.”133  The 
widespread invalidation of form terms is assumed to be impracticable 
given “[t]he economics of the mass distribution of goods” though it has 
been argued that “nothing inherent in the concept of mass distribution 
requires that the drafting party’s terms must prevail.”134  The question of 
 
127.  Cf. TEEVEN, supra note 6, at 294 (“Business favored standardized contracts because 
of the cost of individualized handling of mass transactions and because of the control it gave 
over its agents and the factors of production.  Standardization facilitated better planning and 
security by encouraging certainty and making risks more calculable under agreements drafted 
with the needs of commercial interests in mind.”); Jason Scott Johnston, Cooperative 
Negotiations in the Shadow of Boilerplate, in BOILERPLATE: THE FOUNDATION OF MARKET 
CONTRACTS 20–21 (Omri Ben-Shahar ed., 2007); Rakoff, supra note 126, at 1221, 1228. 
128.  Cf. Johnston, supra note 127, at 20–21; Rakoff, supra note 126, at 1222–24. 
129.  Cf. Johnston, supra note 127, at 19–21; Rakoff, supra note 126, at 1221–22. 
130.  W. David Slawson, Standard Form Contracts and Democratic Control of Lawmaking 
Power, 84 HARV. L. REV. 529, 529–30 (1971). 
131.  Rakoff, supra note 126, at 1178–79 (noting that many standard form contracts do not 
raise the same issues as adhesion contract); see also Nathan Isaacs, The Standardizing of 
Contracts, 27 YALE L.J. 34, 34–35 (1917). 
132.  Rakoff, supra note 126, at 1179, 1228–29; see also Arthur Leff, Unconscionability and 
the Crowd—Consumers and the Common Law Tradition, 31 U. PITT. L. REV. 349 (1970).  
133.  Rakoff, supra note 126, at 1207; see also Leff, supra note 132, at 349. 
134.  Rakoff, supra note 126, at 1208. 
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which party, the drafter of the adhesive terms or the draftee, deserves 
greater deference seems to depend on intuitions about whether the 
government will distribute risks prudently.135 
However, the most important criticism of adhesion contracts is that 
they result in unfair bargains for consumers.  Adhesion contracts tend to 
maximize the rights of the firm and shift unfavorable terms onto 
consumers.136  Nevertheless, courts have generally enforced form 
contracts.137  There has been a wide range of calls for procedural and 
substantive reforms of contracts of adhesion, as well as defenses of the 
current regime.138 
Karl Llewellyn states that in adhesion contracts the consumer’s assent 
to the terms of the writing is relatively limited.139  A consumer specifically 
assented to the few negotiated terms, and then gave blanket assent to the 
remaining terms in the adhesion contract.140  However, because 
consumers did not specifically assent to the unread terms, such “fine 
print” should not be enforced if unreasonable.141  Llewellyn’s approach to 
adhesion contracts bases the justification for enforcing contractual terms 
on the parties’ consent.142  But this raises a question: what can one be 
consenting to when one consents to unread terms?  It cannot be said that 
a person specifically agrees to those terms because the person does not 
know what they are.  Llewellyn’s solution is to describe a fictional 
“blanket assent” to reasonable terms.143  It is fictional because, of course, 
the parties to the contract have not discussed this blanket assent any more 
than they have discussed the unread terms specifically.144  
Llewellyn’s approach attempts to both vindicate and give content to 
the parties’ decision to enter into a contractual relationship, including 
those aspects of the deal that are “sound particularizations of the deal to 
 
135.  Cf. Rakoff, supra note 126, at 1208 n.125.  Rakoff notes that Arthur Leff seemed to 
fear that the government would socialize too many risks; Rakoff believes that fear is 
unsubstantiated.  Id. 
136.  See id. at 1222, 1227. 
137.  Id. at 1184–85. 
138.  See infra pp. 646–55. 
139.  See KARL N. LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION: DECIDING APPEALS 
362–63 (1960). 
140.  See id. at 371. 
141.  See id. at 362–63. 
142.  See Rakoff, supra note 126, at 1199–1200. 
143.  See id. at 1200. 
144.  See id. (“Some adherents may have formed such an intent, but it is unlikely that the 
majority of adherents do, or on reflection would, conceive of the relation in this manner.”). 
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the business,” while fixing a boundary of fairness around that 
relationship.145  Llewellyn expresses some concern that judges were not 
well suited to draw the line between reasonable and unreasonable 
terms.146  He believes that trade practices are good evidence of what 
should be deemed reasonable in an adhesion contact (though he notes 
that unreasonable trade practices need to be rejected) and suggests that 
judges be deferential to an expert’s knowledge of what was fair in a given 
trade.147 
But Todd Rakoff responds that it is “not at all clear that the 
businessman’s expertise, as applied, will yield a better result than the 
judge’s impartiality.”148  An adhesion contract tends to reflect the art of 
the lawyer, not the business person, and the lawyer will “draft up to the 
limit allowed by law . . . .”149 
There is no basis for presuming that the form incorporates any 
relevant social wisdom.  There may be a very good argument for 
allowing parties to educate judges to practical realities, and a very 
good argument against judges’ jumping to apply “general rules”; 
but that is a far cry from adopting a presumption that the form 
document should be enforced.150 
Rakoff characterizes Llewellyn’s approach as an attempt to 
understand adhesion contracts within a framework of private law, which 
emphasizes the interaction of the contract parties.151  Another approach 
is to “acknowledge frankly that the question whether to enforce form 
terms presents a series of policy choices.  If the question is to be 
considered in this light, Llewellyn’s private law stance must be abandoned 
in favor of an investigation of public law approaches.”152  Arthur Leff, for 
example, suggests “a broad program of legislation coupled with 
administrative enforcement, directed in part to requiring greater 
disclosure of terms but aimed primarily at the outright prohibition of 
particular clauses and devices in adhesion contracts.”153  For Leff, 
 
145.  See id. at 1202–03.  Llewellyn believed in enforcing terms unless they were “too 
unfair.”  Id. 
146.  Id. at 1202–04. 
147.  Id. at 1204. 
148.  Id. 
149.  Id. at 1205. 
150.  Id. at 1206. 
151.  Id. at 1198.  
152.  Id. at 1206–07. 
153.  Id. at 1207 (citing Leff, supra note 132, at 357). 
 648 MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW [99:631 
adhesion contracts are used by firms to maximize profits by avoiding 
risks, and the administration of these risks is a matter of public policy 
because adhesion contracts “are mass produced and treat a large number 
of persons in the same way.”154  Thus, form contracts should be regulated 
like products liability.155  
This argument would justify public control of form contracts, but it 
also seems to prove too much by implying that the government should 
determine all the terms of form contracts.156  If the government should 
regulate non-negotiated terms, why shouldn’t it regulate the negotiated 
terms as well?  “[O]nce full enforceability is denied, the premises 
supporting any degree of enforcement are called into question. . . .  
[F]rom the public law standpoint, one perceives no reason not to employ 
rules created by the legal system instead of by the draftsman.”157 
Fredrich Kessler writes that adhesion contracts are the result of the 
“trend of competitive capitalism towards monopoly.”158  Kessler identifies 
the dynamic of bargaining power as allowing firms to dictate terms to 
consumers.159  The consumer comes to the firm in need of goods and 
services, but the consumer is denied the opportunity to negotiate terms 
because the firm has a monopoly or because all of the firm’s competitors 
use similar terms.160  Thus, the consumer must accept what the firm 
offers.161  The enforcement of form contracts grants authoritarian power 
to business firms.162 
Rakoff argues that the usual assumption that form contracts generate 
economic utility cannot be accepted at face value.163  In fact, the opposite 
should be assumed.  Because consumers do not read form contracts, 
profit-seeking firms are incentivized to shift costs to consumers without 
 
154.  Rakoff, supra note 126, at 1209; see also Arthur Allen Leff, Contract as Thing, 19 
AM. U. L. REV. 131, 140–42 (1970). 
155.  Rakoff, supra note 126, at 1209. 
156.  Id. 
157.  Id. at 1215. 
158.  Fredrich Kessler, Contracts of Adhesion—Some Thoughts About Freedom of 
Contract, 43 COLUM. L. REV. 629, 640 (1943). 
159.  Id. at 632. 
160.  Id. 
161.  Id. 
162.  Id. at 640. 
163.  Rakoff, supra note 126, at 1231. 
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lowering their prices.164  Thus, so-called “freedom of contract” in 
adhesion contracts works to exploit consumers.165  
Although in the past, freedom of contract served to promote the 
growth of the market economy and empower people previously unable to 
freely organize their private lives, it has become the contemporary 
embodiment of laissez-faire, which causes courts to overlook “the 
elements of liberty that are actually at stake.”166  Freedom of contract in 
the adhesion contract context does not protect the liberty of a real person, 
but a “drafting organization.”167  But enforcing form contracts does not 
enhance the development of a human being’s capacities through the 
exercise of individual choice; the form contract is simply the business 
technology of a non-human organization.168  What is really at stake is the 
domination of individual human beings by business firms via contract 
law.169  “[R]ecognizing that elimination of such domination, where it 
exists, is . . . a fulfillment of liberty . . . .”170 
Therefore, public officials should choose the terms to be enforced in 
an adhesive contract and choose those terms to promote the common 
good.171  Rakoff finds that adhesive contracts should not be presumed to 
be enforceable.172  Terms that are consciously bargained-for or shopped-
for will be analyzed and enforced according to normal contract law.173  But 
 
164.  Shmuel I. Becher, Behavioral Science and Consumer Standard Form Contracts, 68 
LA. L. REV. 118, 172 (2007); Jonathan Klick, The Microfoundations of Standard Form 
Contracts: Price Discrimination vs. Behavioral Bias, 32 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 555, 556 (2005) 
(“This efficiency view implies that in competitive markets, standardized terms will benefit 
buyers.  A corollary to this is that if we observe ‘abusive’ standardized terms, the market is 
presumptively monopolistic.  Casual observation suggests that standardized contracts are 
nearly ubiquitous, and a great many of the standardized terms appear to benefit the seller to 
the potential detriment of the buyer.” (footnote omitted)); Russell Korobkin, Bounded 
Rationality, Standard Form Contracts, and Unconscionability, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 1203, 1235 
(2003) (“When buyers cannot verify quality, the market will produce lower-quality goods.  
Ironically, far from guaranteeing a market equilibrium of efficient terms, competition can 
guarantee an equilibrium of inefficient terms.” (footnote omitted)); cf. Rakoff, supra note 126, 
at 1204 (“[T]he businessman who absorbs risks may find it difficult to compete with others who 
can lower prices because they disown risks.”). 
165.  See Rakoff, supra note 126, at 1235. 
166.  See id. at 1235–36. 
167.  Id. at 1236. 
168.  Id.  
169.  Id. at 1236–37. 
170.  Id. at 1237. 
171.  Id. at 1238. 
172.  Id. at 1243. 
173.  Id. at 1251. 
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because of the inevitable infringement on individual’s freedom, adhesive 
terms should be presumptively unenforceable.174 
Randy Barnett questions Rakoff’s proposal on many grounds.  He 
doubts public officials are capable of writing appropriate terms to replace 
adhesive terms.175  Such a process will increase transaction costs and 
ultimately harm consumers.176  This process will also increase uncertainty 
of transactions because both drafters and adherents will require legal 
counsel to learn what terms a court is likely to impose upon their 
contractual relationship.177 
Barnett acknowledges that parties do not read form contracts or give 
specific agreement to terms.178  But this is part of “rational ignorance.”179  
Rational ignorance means that given the low probability that a dispute 
will arise over one of the unread terms, and given the low stakes involved 
in most form contracts, it would be “irrational for form-receiving parties 
to spend time reading, much less understanding, the terms in the forms 
they sign.”180  This puts the drafter in the position of knowing that an 
adherent will consent to the form without reading it or understanding it.181  
This is a problem for the traditional approach to contractual assent, as it 
suggests that the parties to a form contract have not actually reached any 
agreement, and therefore, the form is not binding.182  Yet, despite these 
problems, form contracts offer economic benefits to both drafters and 
adherents.183  Thus, Barnett offers a justification for the enforcement of 
 
174.  Id. at 1238. 
175.  Randy E. Barnett, Consenting to Form Contract, 71 FORDHAM L. REV. 627, 633–34 
(2002). 
176.  Id. 
177.  Id. at 634. 
178.  Id. at 629. 
179.  Id. at 631; Daniel E. Wenner, Note, Renting in Collegetown, 84 CORNELL L. REV. 
543, 572–73 (1999) (“The utilization of form contracts creates an environment in which ‘rational 
ignorance plays a particularly powerful role.’  The resource costs of making an informed 
decision with respect to a form contract are extremely high.  Form contracts often contain many 
legal terms, the language of which confuses laypeople.  To execute a form contract safely, a 
layperson would have to pay an attorney to review it, further increasing the transaction costs 
and limiting the form contract’s efficiency.  Indeed, even an attorney would not parse every 
inch of a form contract when he endeavors to ‘rent a car, purchase an airline ticket, enter a 
parking garage, or sign a car loan agreement or apartment lease.’” (footnotes omitted)). 
180.  Barnett, supra note 175, at 631; cf. Klick, supra note 164, at 562 (“That is, perhaps 
the reason that certain terms are systematically non-salient is because their ultimate importance 
is trivial.”). 
181.  Barnett, supra note 175, at 629–30. 
182.  Id. 
183.  Id. at 630–31 (citing Rakoff, supra note 126, at 1220); Michelle A. Sargent, Note, 
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form contracts.  According to Barnett, consenting to form contracts is not 
about making a promise that a party would need to have actually 
understood.  Instead it is “about manifesting consent to be legally 
bound.”184 
Now think of click license agreements on web sites.  When one 
clicks “I agree” to the terms on the box, does one usually know 
what one is doing?  Absolutely.  There is no doubt whatsoever that 
one is objectively manifesting one’s assent to the terms in the box, 
whether or not one has read them.  The same observation applies 
to signatures on form contracts.  Clicking the button that says “I 
agree,” no less than signing one’s name on the dotted line, 
indicates unambiguously: I agree to be legally bound by the terms 
in this agreement.185 
Barnett’s main point is that “in principle, one can consent to terms 
one does not read. . . . [O]ne can consent to terms one is not even shown 
in advance.”186  The only limit is that the drafter may not “exceed some 
bound of reasonableness.”187 
Barnett’s approach has the advantage of being in accord with the U.S. 
Supreme Court’s.188  In Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute, Eulala Shute 
attempted to sue Carnival Cruise Lines in her home state of Washington 
after being injured during a cruise.189  However, the tickets that Eulala 
had purchased indicated that she could only sue in Florida, and ultimately 
the U.S. Supreme Court enforced the forum selection clause.  The fact 
that the forum selection clause was adhesive and would make it difficult 
for the Shutes to bring suit did not make the term unenforceable.190  The 
Court did say that such terms were to be scrutinized for “fundamental 
fairness.”191  However, the term in question was found to be reasonable 
because it served a rational business purpose, enhanced clarity about the 
 
Misplaced Misrepresentations: Why Misrepresentation-of-Age Statutes Must Be Reinterpreted as 
They Apply to Children’s Online Contracts, 112 MICH. L. REV. 301, 307 (2013) (“[C]ourts’ 
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language . . . .”). 
184.  Barnett, supra note 175, at 634. 
185.  Id. at 635. 
186.  Id. at 641 (emphasis omitted). 
187.  Id. at 638. 
188.  Barnett offers Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute, 499 U.S. 585 (1991), as an 
example of his consensual approach to form contracts.  See Barnett, supra note 175, at 638–39. 
189.  499 U.S. at 585.  
190.  Barnett, supra note 175, at 639. 
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parties’ rights, conserved judicial resources, and was economically 
beneficial for all involved.192 
All of these pragmatic justifications have been questioned.  Of course 
a term in a form contract serves a business purpose, but shouldn’t this 
purpose be weighed against the detriment it imposes on the consumer?193  
Also, it is doubtful that form terms actually make parties’ rights and 
obligations clear, at least for consumers, because people do not read form 
contracts.194  Apparently, judicial resources are not actually conserved by 
form contracts, as forum selection clauses are frequently litigated.195  And 
perhaps most importantly, form contracts may not in fact reduce prices 
for consumers.  Competition cannot cause firms to improve contract 
quality when consumers are not reading form contracts because there will 
be no comparison-shopping for terms of which they are unaware.196  In 
other words, competition will actually cause firms to draft worse terms in 
their form contracts. 
However, even if the pragmatic justifications for adhesion contracts 
are in question, there remains the autonomy argument.  Barnett writes 
that “[r]efusing to enforce all of these terms would violate their freedom 
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The Limits of Cognition and the Limits of Contract, 47 STAN. L. REV. 211, 243–44 (1995); Lee 
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quality, the market will produce lower-quality goods.  Ironically, far from guaranteeing a 
market equilibrium of efficient terms, competition can guarantee an equilibrium of inefficient 
terms.” (footnote omitted)); Rakoff, supra note 126, at 1204 (“[T]he businessman who absorbs 
risks may find it difficult to compete with others who can lower prices because they disown 
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to contract.”197  Although consumers sign form contracts without reading 
them, “[t]hey would rather run the risk of agreeing to unread terms than 
either (a) decline to agree or (b) read the terms.”198 
Behavioral economics calls into question this autonomy-based 
argument.  People cannot rationally assess or reject terms that they do 
not know exist.199  Moreover, this ignorance-based consent is unlikely to 
be economically efficient.  “[P]eople deviate, in systematic ways, from 
what is supposed (by standards of efficiency) to be rational behavior.”200  
Consumers are overly optimistic, poor at estimating risk, prone to 
ignoring unfavorable terms in form contracts, throwing good money after 
bad, and accepting unfavorable price changes during contract 
formation.201  
These arguments cast doubt on the premise of autonomous choice.  
People do not always make good choices, so perhaps we should not look 
favorably on their choice to “consent” to boilerplate.  But some go further 
and simply deny that consent to form contracts is an act of autonomy.  
“[T]he enforcement of form terms is objectionable because it undermines 
individual autonomy, as the buyer finds herself obligated to terms to 
which she did not voluntarily agree.”202 
Margaret Radin argues that adhesion contracts are in fact an assault 
on our politics of individual rights and that enforcement of certain 
adhesive terms results in “democratic degradation.”203  “[O]ur system is 
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committed to the moral premise . . . that people who enter contracts are 
voluntarily giving up something in exchange for something they value 
more.”204  But consumers are not voluntarily giving up these rights, and 
through adhesive contracts, firms become lawmaking bodies which are 
deleting people’s basic political rights, such as jury trials and rights of 
redress.205  Adhesive contracts thereby jeopardize the distinction between 
the public–private sphere, the idea of private ordering, and rule of law.206  
Radin’s proposed solution is to make a number of legal rights inalienable 
via adhesion contracts.207 
Omri Ben-Shahar has resisted Radin’s proposal.208  He insists that 
when firms use adhesion contracts, even—or especially—those that 
delete important consumer rights, consumers benefit by paying lower 
prices for goods and services.209  If firms were prevented from deleting 
consumers’ rights through adhesion contracts, prices would go up, which 
would disproportionately affect the poor.210 
Ben-Shahar argues that it is likely that a majority of consumers are 
delighted to get a product at a lower price, even if it is at the cost of certain 
legal rights.211  Although there may be a minority who do not share this 
preference, it would be anti-democratic to impose this minority’s 
preferences on the majority by prohibiting firms from offering rights-
deleting form contracts.212  If consumers wanted to preserve their legal 
rights, the market would supply such an option.213  To Ben-Shahar, a 
program of inalienable legal rights looks like a threat to individual 
autonomy, not protection of it.214  People should be allowed not to care 
about their legal rights, he argues.215  In short, regulating boilerplate 
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would both violate individuals’ autonomy and cause them to pay higher 
prices. 
III. THE BOILERPLATE CHAPTER OF THE LIBERALISM STORY 
The boilerplate debate seems to be an inevitable outcome of 
liberalism.216  Libertarian impulses drive one side of the debate.  
Boilerplate arises from liberalism’s granting to individuals both private 
property and the freedom to exercise their subjective judgment about 
what to do with it, so as to develop their individual capacities and life 
plans.217  Boilerplate expands the private sphere, allowing people to 
engage in private ordering with only minimal oversight by public 
officials.218  As Rakoff notes, when we consider boilerplate, we tend to 
assume that government is limited and that it must justify itself before it 
interferes with people’s freedom of contract.219  Boilerplate could be 
thought of as an instrument of natural right, as people, by the authority 
of their own autonomous wills, bind themselves to their promises. 
Boilerplate enacts a formal equality between contracting parties, 
largely disregarding the parties’ circumstances, including wealth, 
necessity, and sophistication.220  By enforcing boilerplate contracts, courts 
grant people negative liberty, in which absent something like fraud or 
unconscionability, the contract will be enforced.221  And boilerplate is 
recognized as a virtual necessity in the individualistic market economy 
and is deemed to benefit both consumers and business firms.222 
Yet boilerplate raises all the same concerns progressivism has about 
individualism.  Though there may be legal equality between a business 
firm and a consumer, there is enormous substantive inequality between 
them.  Formally, a boilerplate contract may look like an agreement 
between autonomous parties, but substantively it is more like private 
legislation imposed on consumers by business firms.223  And the likely 
consequence is substantively unfair contracts. 
 
higher prices unless people are smart and sophisticated enough to thoughtfully waive these 
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Even if substantively unfair contracts were acceptable, progressives 
doubt that when consumers accept boilerplate terms, they are acting 
autonomously.  There is no real choice because the market only offers 
boilerplate terms.  Further, behavioral economics undermines the notion 
that consumers acceptance of boilerplate terms is rational or 
economically efficient.224  In order to effectuate freedom of contract and 
economic efficiency, progressives argue that government must intervene 
in boilerplate contracts, not in derogation of individual liberty, but for its 
effectuation.225 
Because the boilerplate debate evokes the themes of liberalism, 
perhaps it is susceptible to Alasdair MacIntyre’s critique of liberalism.  As 
in the liberal dialectic, the boilerplate debate is conducted in terms of 
rights and utility.226  Critics of boilerplate argue that accepting boilerplate 
is not a real act of autonomy, while apologists argue adherents receive 
lower prices because of boilerplate.227  Critics argue that boilerplate is not 
actually efficient, while apologists argue that it would violate a person’s 
freedom of contract not to enforce boilerplate terms.228  But rights and 
utility are incommensurable, according to MacIntyre, and this setting of 
rights against utility is, thus, irrational.229 
And the reason we cannot rationally choose between rights and utility 
in the boilerplate debate is because liberalism lacks concepts of human 
nature and purpose.  Liberalism specifically leaves those issues to 
individuals’ subjective judgment.230  So, Radin sees people degrading 
themselves by giving up their legal rights via boilerplate, but Ben-Shahar 
sees the same people as satisfied customers.231  Neither can be objectively 
“correct” if telos is in the eye of the beholder.  What would it even mean 
to degrade a person who does not have a particular human nature?  And 
how can you decide whether “satisfied customer” is a desirable outcome 
without a particular conception of human purpose? 
This is not to say that people cannot choose between the frameworks 
of rights and utility.  It is simply to say that absent concepts of human 
nature and purpose, such choices must be arbitrary acts of will.  And if 
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our selection of moral frameworks is arbitrary, the imposition of that 
framework must be by force, not reason.  In such a situation the logical 
outcome is for those in power to impose their preferences on their 
subjects.232  Perhaps such will to power is evidenced by business firms like 
Carnival Cruise Lines using boilerplate to impose forum selection clauses 
on unwitting consumers like the Shutes.233 
So does the boilerplate debate confirm MacIntyre’s thesis about the 
incoherence of liberalism?  The final part of this Article argues that the 
boilerplate debate, in fact, resists MacIntyre’s critique and demonstrates 
the rationality of liberalism, at least in the context of the boilerplate 
debate. 
IV. CONCLUSION: BOILERPLATE, THE RATIONALITY OF LIBERALISM, 
AND HUMAN NATURE 
In this part, I will offer three pieces of evidence that the boilerplate 
debate resists MacIntyre’s critique of liberalism: (1) courts are not 
engaged in paternalistic overreach; (2) business firms are not imposing 
harsh terms on consumers; and (3) in the boilerplate debate, rights and 
utility are not set against each other, as advocates argue that both rights 
and utility justify their positions. 
The liberal narrative suggests that what should concern us about 
boilerplate is the potential for abuse of power.  Freedom is not an 
abstraction to be analytically unpacked so we can learn what it means.  
Nothing in the definition of “freedom” will tell us whether we should 
enforce or invalidate a boilerplate contract.  Instead, it is the relevant 
circumstances that tell us what freedom means.  And whether it was the 
Ancien Régime or laissez-faire, liberalism’s use of the concept of freedom 
has been oriented by abuse of power.  Likewise, if MacIntyre’s diagnosis 
of liberalism were correct, we should expect to find abuse of power via 
boilerplate. 
When it comes to boilerplate, where should we look for abuse of 
power?  Libertarianism looks first to the government as a likely culprit, 
and we should not ignore the possibility of paternalistic infringement 
upon individual freedom.234  Yet, when it comes to boilerplate contracts, 
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the law favors the enforcement of boilerplate, and courts tend to refrain 
from interfering with boilerplate relationships.235  Currently, there is little 
danger that courts will abuse their power in the boilerplate context, at 
least through paternalistic overreaching. 
The more likely source of abuse of power is business firms.  Many 
scholars have noted the likelihood that business firms will use boilerplate 
to impose one-sided terms on consumers.236  The logic of the market 
seems to require it.  And yet, surprisingly, the empirical evidence 
confounds this expectation. 
Florencia Marotta-Wurgler has been engaged in empirical research 
that essentially studies whether standard form contracts are “an 
instrument of market power” allowing “dominant corporations” to 
impose one-sided terms on consumers or if instead competition forces 
such contracts to be efficient.237  Marotta-Wurgler analyzed 647 software 
license agreements from 598 different software companies.238  She 
constructed an index to measure these agreements’ “buyer 
friendliness.”239  The index was based on twenty-five common terms that 
allocate rights and risks between contract parties, and she then measured 
the buyer or seller friendliness of each term relative to the default rules 
of Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code.240  Marotta-Wurgler also 
investigated the role competition plays in determining these agreements’ 
terms.241 
Marotta-Wurgler’s research revealed that these agreements did tend 
to be seller friendly.  However, she also determined that sellers offer the 
same terms to consumers and large businesses via boilerplate, indicating 
that sellers are not taking advantage of their bargaining power over 
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consumers in order to impose one-sided terms.242  Further, she has found 
that contract terms do not become more biased depending on whether 
sellers have greater market power.243  Counterintuitively, one 
measurement of sellers’ market power actually indicated that increased 
market power was associated with “slightly more pro-buyer terms.”244  
“[W]e can conclude that market power, however defined, does not lead 
to meaningfully worse standard terms overall . . . .”245 
Marotta-Wurgler’s research suggests that business firms are not using 
their superior bargaining power to impose one-sided terms on less 
powerful consumers.  If they were, we should see worse terms being 
offered to the general public than to the large businesses, but that is not 
the case, at least according to Marotta-Wurlger’s research.246 
Thus, boilerplate tells us something surprising: both the public and 
private sectors are more or less behaving themselves.  Courts are not 
engaged in paternalistic overreach, and business firms are not imposing 
harsh terms on consumers.  Contrary to MacIntyre’s argument, the 
powerful are not arbitrarily imposing their will on the people.  Why? 
According to MacIntyre, will to power is preceded by incoherence in 
liberal moral dialogue, when rights are set against utility.247  But when we 
turn to the boilerplate debate, we find something interesting about the 
roles played by rights and utility.  They are not set against each other.  
They are not adversaries, but allies.  Both sides of the boilerplate debate 
argue that their programs vindicate both rights and utility.248  Boilerplate 
apologists argue that consumers consent to boilerplate and that the 
enforcement of boilerplate benefits consumers and business firms.249  
Boilerplate critics argue that consumers have not really consented and 
that enforcement of boilerplate is inefficient.250  Neither side asserts that 
rights trump utility or vice versa.  The framework is agreed upon: 
boilerplate enforcement requires both individual consent and social 
utility. 
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Of course, there is disagreement about what counts as consent and 
what counts as utility, but there is agreement about the terms of the 
debate.  Disagreement is not always because of incommensurability.  In 
fact, MacIntyre notes that “when a tradition is in good order it is always 
partially constituted by an argument about the goods the pursuit of which 
gives to that tradition its particular point and purpose.”251  At least in the 
boilerplate debate, liberalism, whether libertarian or progressive, insists 
on promoting both individual rights and social welfare.  There is often 
disagreement about how to promote these goods, or even what these 
goods actually consist of, but there is agreement about the framework of 
the debate.  Thus, the disagreement is rational. 
And if the boilerplate debate is rational, something greater is implied.  
Moral debate becomes irrational, according to MacIntyre, when it is 
conducted without reference to human nature and purpose.252  Thus, if 
the boilerplate debate is rational, we can infer that, somehow, it is being 
regulated by concepts of human nature and purpose, those concepts 
ostensibly disclaimed by liberalism long ago. 
What is human nature?  What is human purpose?  These are the 
questions theorists must address if they are to answer the practical 
questions posed by both liberalism and boilerplate.  The overarching 
rationality of the boilerplate debate resists MacIntyre’s charge that 
liberalism is incoherent.  But this rational framework does not answer the 
specific questions of the boilerplate debate.  What is better for a person, 
to retain their legal rights or to get a good price on an iPhone?  To answer 
such questions, theorists must turn their attention to human nature and 
purpose. 
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